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Abstract—Vehicular Ad-hoc NETwork (VANET), a novel tech-
nology holds a paramount importance within the transportation
domain due to its abilities to increase traffic efficiency and
safety. Connected vehicles propagate sensitive information which
must be shared with the neighbors in a secure environment.
However, VANET may also include dishonest nodes such as
Man-in-the-Middle (MiTM) attackers aiming to distribute and
share malicious content with the vehicles, thus polluting the
network with compromised information. In this regard, estab-
lishing trust among connected vehicles can increase security as
every participating vehicle will generate and propagate authentic,
accurate and trusted content within the network. In this paper,
we propose a novel trust model, namely, Man-in-the-middle
Attack Resistance trust model IN connEcted vehicles (MARINE),
which identifies dishonest nodes performing MiTM attacks in an
efficient way as well as revokes their credentials. Every node
running MARINE system first establishes trust for the sender
by performing multi-dimensional plausibility checks. Once the
receiver verifies the trustworthiness of the sender, the received
data is then evaluated both directly and indirectly. Extensive
simulations are carried out to evaluate the performance and
accuracy of MARINE rigorously across three MiTM attacker
models and the bench-marked trust model. Simulation results
show that for a network containing 35% MiTM attackers,
MARINE outperforms the state of the art trust model by 15%,
18%, and 17% improvements in precision, recall and F-score,
respectively.
Keywords—Connected Vehicles, Trust Management, Trust
Model, Smart Cities, Man-in-the-middle Attack, VANET
I. INTRODUCTION
Vehicular Ad-hoc NETwork (VANET) has emerged as a
promising solution to address the current challenges faced
by the transportation systems and vehicles. VANET increases
traffic safety as well as offers other infotainment services to
passengers. In VANET, the connected vehicles equipped with
numerous sensors share critical information such as traffic
accident-avoidance or black-ice warnings through different
modes of communications, i.e., Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V),
Vehicle-to-Roadside Unit (V2R) and hybrid [1]–[3]. Fig. 1
highlights the realization of VANET within a smart city.
The data generated by the vehicular nodes is usually shared
with central servers (depending on the service provider) to
generate traffic management-related messages as well as with
the neighbors to generate short-range traffic view [4].
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Fig. 1: Realization of VANET in Smart City
Abstractly, VANET constitutes safety messages, therefore,
ensuring security of both communication and content is essen-
tial. Due to the intermittent communication among vehicles in
VANET, providing such secure environment for message prop-
agation is challenging in the presence of possibly dishonest
nodes with the aim to launch a wide range of attacks including
Man-in-the-Middle (MiTM), black-hole, Sybil, malware injec-
tions and Denial-of-Service (DoS) etc [5]–[7]. These dishonest
nodes pollute the network with compromised messages which
are then shared with other neighbors. The high mobility of the
connected vehicles further increases the network complexity.
Over the past decade, VANET security was the main theme
of various notable projects including EVITA [8], PRESERVE
[9], CONVERGE [10], and UKCITE [11] etc., to name a few,
where various solutions are suggested to secure VANET.
Most of the current security solutions rely on traditional
cryptography and Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). These
solutions address most of the security challenges to some
extent, for instance, they can easily identify outsider attackers.
However, PKI-based solutions fail to detect attacks launched
by insider attackers due to the fact that they are legitimate
members as they possess valid credentials.
In order to address the shortcoming of the PKI-based
security solutions, the concept of trust is introduced as a
security parameter in VANET which has the ability to identify
2insider attackers by mutually evaluating the shared messages.
In the context of VANET, trust is defined as the faith which
one vehicle places in other vehicle(s) for sharing reliable,
trusted, accurate, and authentic messages [12], [13]. However,
evaluating trust on the basis of the received information in a
limited time among vehicles is extremely challenging as the
vehicles only communicate for a short period of time.
Trust models are generally categorized into entity-centric,
data-centric, and combined models based on their revocation
targets. To secure VANET from trust perspective, a wide
range of metrics are introduced including mutual interac-
tion evaluations, neighbour recommendations and messages
scrutiny, to name a few. Further, current trust management
solutions rely on different similarity measurement techniques,
which add a considerable amount of undesired overhead to the
original shared messages, to compare the generated messages.
In addition, the focus of most of these solutions are on
revoking dishonest vehicles or their malicious content based
on either identity related or messages analysis metrics. Even
combined trust models consider only one category of metrics,
where, a genuine node generates fake or malicious message
due to compromised sensor, and an attacker generates true
messages about an occurring event. Therefore, both nodes
honesty and true messages are pre-requisite for an efficient
trust management scheme for these solutions.
To fill the security gaps in VANET, in this paper, we propose
an efficient and light-weight trust management model that
enables the vehicular nodes to evaluate the entity (sender)
trust and content (the shared information) trust in an intelligent
manner. The main contributions of this paper are summarized
below:
• A new trust management model (MARINE), that evalu-
ates and manages trust among the communicating vehi-
cles in VANET, is proposed.
• In MARINE, we incorporate both entity trust and content
trust where entity trust is evaluated through extensive
plausibility checks and the content trust is evaluated
through neighbors recommendation. This two-step trust
management solution helps eradicating the problem of
insiders attacks where one solution is not enough to
mitigate the attacks.
• We propose a Man-in-The-Middle (MiTM)-resistant trust
framework to stop the dishonest nodes from sharing
malicious information.
• We carry out extensive simulations to validate the pro-
posed scheme and evaluate the efficiency of MARINE
from accuracy and trust standpoints.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In
Section II, we present related work on trust management in
VANET. Next, Section III provides details of our proposed
MARINE scheme. Afterwards, the simulation environment
is explained in Section IV including simulation results of
MARINE. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section V.
II. RELATED WORK
The main motivation of the trust models in VANET is to
disseminate accurate, authentic and up-to-date trusted content
among the network entities. However, due to the highly inter-
mittent and mobile nature of vehicular nodes, establishing and
evaluating trust for the received information is a challenging
task. [14], [15].
VANET involves two revocation targets, i.e., (1) partici-
pating network entities, and (2) data exchanged among these
nodes, resulting in fully distributed trust management schemes
[16]. Further, the data can be exchanged through connected
infrastructure (i.e., Road-Side Unit - RSU) adjacent to the
road with the aim to disseminate trusted content to a large geo-
graphical location. The RSU-based trust management schemes
are the centralized trust models. Based on this information,
the resultant trust models can further be categorized into three
classes, i.e., (1) entity-centric trust models, (2) data-centric
trust models, and (3) combined trust ( hybrid) models [17]–
[19] as shown in Fig. 2.
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Fig. 2: Categories of Trust Models in VANET
A. Entity-centric Trust Models (ECTM)
The major aim of entity-trust is to identify the presence of
dishonest nodes within the pool of legitimate vehicles. These
trust models rely on the opinions provided by its neighbours
where a reputation-based trust evaluation methodology is em-
ployed to evaluate the trustworthiness of the sender. Currently,
various ECTMs are proposed in the literature. Marmol et al.
[20], proposed a centralized entity-centric trust model where
vehicular reputation is evaluated by the message evaluator
(MEval) with the help of adjacent RSU. Upon reception of
the messages, a fuzzy-based trust score is generated by the
MEval which depends on the information received via three
sources, i.e., recommendation shared by RSU, recommenda-
tion provided by nearby vehicles, and previous reputation of
the sender. Once, the trust-score is generated, MEval takes
one of the following decision, i.e., (1) drop the message if
not trustworthy, (2) MEval accepts the message but do not
forward it, and (3) accept and forward the message. The main
drawback of this trust model is the extra overhead generated by
multiple sources in order to provide reputation of the sender.
Another approach for revoking dishonest nodes from the
network was proposed by Khan et al. [21], where a cluster-
based mechanism is introduced in the network. First, a cluster
3head (CH) is selected by the nodes, which employs a watch-
dog mechanism in its neighbourhood. Honest nodes report
to CH by providing its recommendation about the presence
of misbehaving entity in its vicinity. Once, the dishonest
nodes are detected, CH informs the central trusted authority
(CTA) which eliminates them from the pool of trusted nodes.
However, this approach requires high amount of overheads
generation due to continuous reports exchange between nodes
which reduces the overall network efficiency.
A similar cluster-oriented trust model was presented by
Jesudoss et al. [22], where every node follows a truth-telling
approach to disseminate true content to get better reputation.
Further, these nodes must participate in the election of CH
in the network, which provides incentives in the form of
weights to these nodes. CH only trusts the information if the
participating node gains sufficient weights in CH election.
This solution fails in a highly mobile and rural scenario due
to limited number of neighbouring vehicles. As a result, the
presence of dishonest nodes in such location may result in the
biased selection of CH .
A centralized entity-centric trust model namely Reputation-
based Global Trust Establishment (RGTE) was proposed by
Li et al. [23]. In this model, the vehicles compute reputation
of the vehicles in theirs close vicinity and share their opinions
with the centralized Reputation Management Center (RMC)
via RSUs. RSUs are responsible to calculate the overall trust
of the sender. Further, RMC updates the node reputation,
and shares the updated list with the neighbouring vehicles
after a short interval of time. The major limitation of this
model are: (1) the overheads caused by the neighbouring
vehicles by sharing their opinions with RMC, and (2) the delay
which RMC takes to inform participating vehicles about the
trustworthiness of the sender node.
Haddadou et al. [24], on the other hand, adapted a different
approach where an economic incentive model was introduced
to exclude dishonest nodes from the network. Every partici-
pating node is bootstrapped with a specific credit value, which
is incremented and decremented based on the behaviour of the
node. For a good behaviour, credit of the node is incremented
by the MEval, while, in case of an attack, it is decreased for
its misconduct in the network. If the credit of the node falls
to 0, the node is classified as malicious and is revoked from
the network. The major constraint of this trust model is its
inability to differentiate between direct or indirect trust.
B. Data-centric Trust Models (DCTM)
Data-centric trust mechanism evaluates the trustworthiness
of the received messages, rather than the evaluating the trust
of the message sender. To date, various data-centric trust
solutions have been proposed in the literature. For instance,
Lo et al. [25] proposed a trust evaluation mechanism namely
Event-based Reputation System (ERS) to prevent the vehicles
to disseminate compromised and malicious warning messages
in the network. In this method, a cooperative event observation
mechanism and reputation scheme is employed to share the
event confidence and reputation thresholds with the MEval.
Based on the evaluation results, MEval determines whether
to broadcast and disseminate traffic warning messages or not.
The main limitation of this approach is the time taken by the
MEval to decide and share the trusted information with the
neighbors in time.
To assess the information generated by malicious nodes,
Shaikh et al. proposed an intrusion-aware data trust model,
where four distinct sources including location closeness, time
closeness, location verification, and time-stamp verification are
utilized to compute a confidence value for every received mes-
sage [26]. While preserving identity of vehicle, this scheme
suffers from a wide number of geographical problems includ-
ing the generation of high number of messages describing
the same event. Further, safety-related messages are delay-
sensitive, therefore, processing time to compute confidence
value can lead to unwanted situations such as late accident
notification.
Unlike [26], Rawat et al. [27] introduced combined op-
portunistic/deterministic approaches, where MEval computes
the similarity between the messages representing same events.
Thus, this trust model filters out the different minority of
messages from the pool of the received messages. Next,
a deterministic approach based on coordinates of vehicles
position and received signal strength estimation is ensured by
comparing malicious vehicles and their transmitted messages.
Similar to [26], this proposal is also time consuming and as a
result, it fails to provide expected level of security in critical
and extreme cases. Further, this trust model requires a large
number of communicating vehicles, thus it fails to operate in
rural scenarios.
To address the dynamics (high mobility and random dis-
tribution) of VANET, Liu et al. presented a lightweight
data-centric trust model, namely LSOT which operates in a
fully distributed manner [28]. To accurately determine the
overall trust evaluations, three factors (number weight, time
decay weight and context weight) are integrated for the trust-
based evaluations. On the other hand, LSOT also relied on
recommendation-based evaluations to identify and maintain
its neighbourhood by creating a trusted environment. The
main shortcoming of this scheme is its failure to distinguish
among the trust of node and the message. If any sensor of the
legitimate vehicle is faulty or impersonated by an attacker, then
compromised messages will be transmitted from that vehicle,
which ultimately pollutes the network with wrong information.
C. Combined Trust Models (CTM)
Combine trust models aggregate the properties of both
entity-centric and data-centric trust management schemes,
where node trust is calculated based on the trust evaluations of
the received messages. Recently, different studies have been
conducted where trust is established based on the characteris-
tics of both data and entity. For instance, Ahmed et al. pro-
posed a logistic-based trust computation technique to quickly
identify the nodes transmitting compromised and malicious
messages [29]. In this technique, MEval closely observes the
events occurring within its vicinity, thus information shared
by neighbouring vehicles directly depicts the behaviour of
the sender which is calculated through weighted voting and
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Fig. 3: Operation of the Proposed Trust Model
logistic trust function. Since the trust is evaluated based on
weighted voting, the trust computation can be biased if MEval
is surrounded by dishonest nodes.
Li et al. introduced an attack-resistant combined trust model,
where MEval estimates the trust on the received information
by evaluating both node and data-centric trust [30]. The data
trustworthiness is calculated based on Bayesian Inference (BI),
where MEval relies on the information received from multiple
neighbours. Furthermore, MEval integrates Functional Trust
(FT) and Recommendation Trust (RT) to evaluate node-centric
trustworthiness. FT ensures that the participating node behaves
properly while communicati g with MEval, while RT main-
tains a certain level of trust before the node can be trusted.
This scheme does not take data sparsity into account, which
is pervasive in VANET.
To quickly revoke the malicious nodes from the network,
Chen et al. proposed a novel evidence-based trust management
scheme which integrates both direct and indirect trust [31].
MEval establishes direct trust at a local level, while indirect
trust is computed using BI to filter out the malicious informa-
tion received from the neighbouring vehicles. This approach
aims to compute a global trust value on the received infor-
mation, which is then shared with the neighbouring vehicles
directly and via RSU. Although this trust model is efficient
as it evaluates the trust on the received information in a small
interval of time; however, a high number of neighbours are
required around MEval to compute indirect trust.
Recently, Mahmood et al. presented a novel combined trust
model which relies on traditional clustering mechanism to
evaluate trust of the network nodes [32]. In this trust model,
cluster head (CH) is elected in the network based on the
trust of the participating nodes and their available resources.
CH is responsible for transmitting trusted messages within the
network. However, the main drawback of this approach is the
biased election of CH , if majority of the nodes are dishonest
in th network.
In a nutshell, various trust models have been proposed in
VANET that ensure the propagation of trusted content in the
network. According to our literature review, most of these trust
models operate only at the application layer, arising technical
challenges including higher network delays. In this paper, we
propose a novel combined trust model which operates at the
two layers, i.e., network and application layers. Further, RSU
is utilized to compute the global trust value with the aim to
share trusted content with neighbouring vehicles at a large
geographical location.
In the next section, we provide explanations of our proposed
trust mod l.
III. PROPOSED MARINE TRUST MANAGEMENT MODEL
In this section, we provide the details of our proposed
trust model, i.e, MARINE. First, we abstractly describe MA-
RINE, followed by its operation and trust evaluation. The
detailed proposal is highlighted in Fig. 3, suggesting that
MARINE involves various steps in order to trusts the in-
formation from sender by evaluating it in two dimensions
including, node-centric trust computation and data-centric trust
computation. Further, MARINE integrates both inter-vehicular
and infrastructure-based trust computation in order to provide
higher accuracy of detecting malicious content in large geo-
graphical locations.
5A. Baseline of MARINE
The MARINE is a novel and efficient mechanism to evaluate
the trust in VANET, which not only integrates the information
and opinion shared by vehicles, but also takes the sugges-
tions provided by nearby RSU. MARINE is a lightweight
trust model that operates in two stages to evaluate inter-
vehicular trust. First, it evaluates the sender node to identify its
trustworthiness. This is achieved via previous interactions and
the recommendations provided by the neighbouring vehicles.
Second, once node-centric trust is calculated, the received data
is evaluated in three distinct dimensions, i.e., (1) information
quality, (2) node’s message forwarding capability, and (3)
opinions from neighbours. Data from the sender node is
accepted only if both node and data-centric trust is computed
successfully. Otherwise the evaluator node will drop the data.
MARINE relies on both vehicles (inter-vehicular trust com-
putation) and RSU (infrastructure-based trust computation)
to compute the overall trust on the sender and the received
information.
B. Inter-vehicular Trust Computation
In order to trust the received information, MARINE involves
the following two steps, i.e., (1) node-centric trust computa-
tion, and (2) data-centric trust computation.
1) Step 1: Node-centric trust computation: In the first
step, MARINE evaluates trust on sender transmitting the
safety messages. The communication module embedded in the
vehicles enables them to share messages with the neighbouring
vehicles in a specific range, which directly depends on the
height and position of the antenna on the transmitting vehicle
[33], [34]. A slight change in the antenna position and height
can distort the signal strength, which ultimately results in
a signal loss. This impacts the message transmission range
and the neighbouring vehicles may be unable to receive the
transmitted messages. In this regard, we define “MRange” as a
function of (1) distance (DMS<−>MR ) between MS and MR,
(2) sender antenna height (ASender), and (3) receiver antenna
height (AReceiver) as follows.
MRange =
√
(DMS<−>MR)
2
+ (ASender +AReceiver)2
(1)
MR upon receiving message, performs various plausibility
checks that depend solely on the MRange. MR classifies mes-
sage as malicious if it is received outside its range. However,
if the message is received from the vehicle located within
its MRange, then MR first checks its existing database for
previous interactions. For every encounter, the vehicles keep
track of each other (i.e., V ehID) along with its trust values.
The existence of non-zero entry within the database of MR
depicts that the sender vehicle has been encountered previously
as vehicles in the network are assigned with unique identities
(IDs). In case the vehicles are communicating with each other
for the first time, the database will have no entry within its
database. Next, MR checks the trust value of the encountered
vehicle. Every vehicle assigns two trust ratings for every
encountered vehicle, i.e., (1) positive trust rating (RatingPos)
for sharing true and trusted message, and (2) negative trust
rating (RatingNeg) for malicious messages. MR will trust
the node only, if the resultant trust level (TL) is higher than
the pre-defined trust threshold (TRThreshold). In this case,
MR assigns partial reward (α1) to the MS and forwards the
message to Step 2 for evaluating the content of the received
message. However, if TL is less than TRThreshold, MR
discards the received message directly and provides penalty
(β) to the MS .
In order to allow the communication among vehicles for
the very first time, MR creates an entry within its database
along with the default minimum (TLMin). To gain the trust
of (MR), the new vehicle must ensure to provide true content,
otherwise, the messages shared from such vehicles are classi-
fied as malicious. We summarize the checks performed in this
step in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: Step 1: Node-centric trust computation
Input: Vehicle ID (IDNode); Trust level (TL); Minimum
trust level (TLmin); Trust threshold (TRThreshold);
Message threshold range (MRange); Partial Reward
(α1); Penalty (β)
if (Message ∈ MRange) then
Check Vehicle ID (V ehID);
if (V ehID ∈ Database) then
Check TL;
if (TL ≥ TRThreshold) then
TL = TL + α1;
(Goto Step 2: Data-centric trust computation);
else
Classify as dishonest vehicle;
TL = TL - β;
Update Database;
end
else
Insert V ehID to Database for new vehicles;
TL = TLmin;
end
else
Discard M ;
Insert IDNode to Database;
TL = TMin;
end
2) Step 2: Data-centric trust computation: Once node-
centric trust is calculated in Step 1, MR evaluates trust on
the content of the received message. Since, messages can be
delivered at the MR either directly or through intermediate
neighbours, therefore, two methods of trust computation are
performed in this step:
Direct Trust Computation: MR computes trust on the
received message directly based on two important factors: (1)
quality of the received message (MQuality), and (2) ability of
the node to disseminate message.
According to ETSI, MQuality depends directly on the
distance of the received message [35]. The greater the distance
between MS and MR, the higher is the probability that
6message is generated from dishonest vehicle. To this end, we
divide the geographical location between sender and receiver
into 4 tiers (µ), i.e.,
MQuality =

1 if 0 < DMS<−>MR ≤ µ1
0.75 if µ1 < DMS<−>MR ≤ µ2
0.5 if µ2 < DMS<−>MR ≤ µ3
0.25 if µ3 < DMS<−>MR ≤ µ4
0 if DMS<−>MR > µ4
(2)
Tier-1
Tier-2
Tier-3
RMessage
Tier-4
Tier-4
Tier-3
Tier-1
Tier-2
µ4 
µ3 
µ2 
µ1 
MR 
Ms1 
Ms2 
Ms3 Message received from outside RMessage 
Message received from within RMessage 
Fig. 4: Tier-based Threshold Approach
In equation 2, µ1, µ2, µ3, µ4 are respective boundaries of
the tiers between MS and MR as depicted in Fig. 4. In this
paper, we followed a tier-based approach due to the fact that
MR is unable to distinguish between legitimate and malicious
messages generated from MS , if the distance is very large
between them. As an illustration, MR receives messages from
three vehicles MS1, MS2 and MS3, which are located in
different tiers of MR. MS1 and MS2 are located within tier
2 and tier 3, therefore, the respective values of MQuality
assigned by MR are 0.75 and 0.5. However, MR assigns 0
to vehicle 3 as it is received from outside of the range of MR.
Next, we also take into account the ability of the vehicle
to disseminate and share information with the neighboring
vehicles. To this end, we define a “Message Disseminate Ratio
(MDR)” as follows:
MDR =
n∑
i=1
α× PTR
(α× PTR) + (β × PDR) (3)
In equation 3, PTR is the packet transmit ratio, depicting
the ability of the vehicle to transmit messages with its n
neighbors. α is the reward awarded for their honesty and
transmitting messages towards other nodes. PDR, on the other
hand, indicates the class of the dropped messages at the
vehicle. PTR for the legitimate vehicles will be high as the
number of messages dropped at the node are very limited.
However, for MiTM attackers, this ratio will be low, as high
number of messages are dropped at the node. Similarly, β
represents the penalty given to malicious vehicles, failing to
transmit and share messages. As a result, MDR is mostly low
for malicious nodes. Once MQuality and MDR are identified,
MR calculates direct trust (DTR) according to equation 4.
DTR =
1
2
n∑
i=1
(MQuality ×MDR
MQuality +MDR
)
(4)
Indirect Trust Computation: MARINE also takes into
account the opinions generated by the intermediate vehicles.
Specifically, the proposed system categorizes opinions pro-
vided by ‘n’ neighbor vehicles into two distinct classes, i.e.,
(1) positive opinions (PO), and (2) negative opinions (NO).
Upon receiving an indirect message, MR computes indirect
trust (ITR) as follows:
ITR =
[( α
α+ β
×
n∑
i=1
PO
)
+
( β
α+ β
×
n∑
i=1
NO
)] 1n
(5)
In equation 5, α and β are the respective reward and
penalty factors as explained earlier, n represents the 1-hop
direct neighbours of MR which provides respective positive
opinions (PO) and negative opinions (NO) about the received
messages.
Once, DTR and ITR are computed at the MR, the overall
inter-vehicular trust (TrustInter) is computed according to:
TrustInter = RO ×
√
(DTR+ ITR)
n
Dist (6)
In equation 6, RO represents the opinions and the infor-
mation provided by role-oriented vehicles (vehRole), which
are regarded as highly trusted vehicles, including law-
enforcement, ambulances, public buses, taxis etc. due to the
fact that they are regulated and authorized by a central
authority or specific department such as local councils [36],
[37]. On the other hand, the major portion of the network
constitutes such vehicles which have no role in the network,
i.e., traditional vehicles (V ehTrad). Messages generated by
these vehicles must be evaluated for their trustworthiness. In
this paper, we modeled RO according to equation 7. Further,
algorithm 2 summarizes the process of choosing values for
RO.
RO =
{
0.8 ≤ RO ≤ 1.0 if veh = vehRole
RO = 0.5 if veh = V ehTrad
(7)
Algorithm 2: RO computation
Required: Message (M ); vehicle type (veh);
Role-oriented vehicles (vehRole); Traditional vehicles
(vehTrad);
Get vehicle type (veh);
if ((veh) == vehRole) then
0.8 ≤ RO ≤ 1.0;
else
RO = 0.5;
end
Fig. 5 depicts the high-level flow chart of inter-vehicular
trust computation in MARINE.
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C. Infrastructure-based Trust Computation
Deploying infrastructure (such as RSU) along the road in
both urban and rural areas is extremely challenging task due
to (1) high cost, and (2) presence of different obstacles, thus
affecting the coverage of RSU [38], [39]. However, RSU
can be useful in disseminating messages by increasing the
coverage area and providing the quasi global view of the
overall network [40]. Therefore, from the trust management
perspective, RSU can be helpful in broadcasting and sharing
trusted information with large number of vehicles.
In MARINE, vehicles manages two reports about the en-
countered vehicles, i.e., (1) positive reports (PR) contain
information about vehicles with positive ratings, and (2)
negative reports (NR) represent vehicles which are classified
as malicious by the vehicles. Whenever these vehicles ap-
proach within the coverage of certain RSU, they share these
reports with RSU. RSU upon receiving messages, computes
Infrastructure-based trust (TrustIntra) on the received reports
using equation 8.
TrustIntra =
( α
α+ β
×
n∑
i=1
PR
)
+
( β
α+ β
×
n∑
i=1
NR
)
(8)
Factors α and β are the same reward and penalty factors as
described previously. RSU shares the updated report about the
trusted and dishonest vehicles with the neighboring vehicles
periodically to maintain the trusted environment in the net-
work. We summarize the data-centric trust computation within
MARINE in Algorithm 3.
D. Global Trust Computation
MARINE facilitates the vehicles to quickly identify MiTM
attackers. In MARINE, every vehicle establishes a quasi global
view of the network, which enables them to evaluate trust in
both the presence and absence of the RSU. Let n represents
Algorithm 3: Data-centric Trust Computation in MARINE
Required: Message (M ); Message Range (MRange),
Positive reports (PR), Negative reports (NR), Positive
opinions (PO), Negative opinions (NO), Direct trust
ratio (DTR), Indirect trust ratio (ITR), Message
dissemination ratio (MDR), Message receiver (MR),
Infrastructure-based vehicular trust (TrustIntra),
Inter-vehicular trust (TrustInter);
Message dissemination across the network;
if (RSU present within MRange of MR) then
Compute PR;
Compute NR;
Calculate TrustIntra using equation 8;
else
Compute TrustInter;
if (M directly received at MR) then
Calculate MQuality via equation 2;
Identify MDR using equation 3;
Compute DTR using equation 4
else
if (M indirectly received at MR) then
Compute PO;
Compute NO;
Calculate ITR using equation 5;
else
end
end
end
the neighboring vehicles within the vicinity of the RSU, then
global trust (GTC) can be computed as follows:
GTC =
[√
TrustInter +
√
TrustIntra
] 1
n
(9)
If there is no RSU in the vicinity, MARINE still enables the
vehicles to evaluate trust on the received information through
TrustInter.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we perform extensive simulations to evaluate
our proposed scheme. First we discuss the simulation model
followed by discussion on the obtained results.
A. Simulation Model
To evaluate the performance of MARINE, we exploit
VEINS, an open-source simulator, designed specifically to
evaluate the performance of the vehicular networks [41]. To
validate MARINE, a real map from the city of Derby, United
Kingdom has been extracted from OpenStreetMap [42]. Fur-
ther, a real mobility trace of 100 vehicles has been generated
on the extracted map using SUMO [43], which is considered
enough for various urban scenarios [44]. Furthermore, ten
RSUs are randomly deployed at a fixed locations across the
map as shown in Fig. 6.
8Fig. 6: Extracted Map of Derby, United Kingdom
Moreover, a safety-related event (i.e., accident) is generated
at a random location within the network. The first vehicle
located within the close proximity of accident generates a
message regarding this event and share with its neighbours.
Every vehicle within the network validates the authenticity
and accuracy of the received message as they are equipped
with MARINE trust model. Next, MiTM nodes are introduced
within this network, whose sole aim is to either drop the
received message or share the compromised message with the
neighbours. Further, the quantity of these malicious nodes are
increased from 5% to 40% in order to validate the efficiency
of MARINE in terms of identifying malicious nodes and their
compromised data.
Finally, every simulation scenario is carried out twenty-five
with random seed value every time to ensure unique initial ve-
hicle assignment within the network. Moreover, experimental
results are generated by averaging over twenty-five runs. The
details of the simulations are provided in Table I.
TABLE I: Simulation Parameters
Parameters Value
Simulation Time (secs) 600 secs
Simulation Area (km × km) 2.5km × 2.5km
Vehicles Distribution Random
Total Number of Vehicles 25, 50, 75, 100
Role-oriented Vehicles (%) 5
Total Number of RSUs 10
Total MiTM attackers (%) 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, 40
MAC Protocol IEEE 802.11p
Network Protocol WAVE
Radio Propagation Model Two-Ray Interference
Packet Data Size 1024 bits
Packet Header Size 256 bits
TrustInitial 0.5
TrustThreshold 0.5
α 0.01
α1 (α1 = 0.1 × α) 0.001
β (β = 10 × α) 0.1
B. MiTM Attacker Models
The main motivation of the trust model is to disseminate
trusted information within the network. Therefore, to evaluate
the performance of MARINE, we defined following three
variants of MiTM attackers:
1) Attacker Model 1: In this model, we equipped the MiTM
with the ability to tamper the legitimate messages and share
compromised messages with the network nodes. Further, these
nodes also intelligently share bogus trust values with the
vehicles in order to gain the trust of the honest vehicles. This
attacker model misleads the vehicles by sharing malicious and
compromised content, thus, it is very important to evaluate the
trust model under this attacker model.
2) Attacker Model 2: This attacker model considers a
selfish MiTM attacker who deliberately drops and delay the
safety messages. The attacker acts as a sink where messages
are dropped or delayed intentionally, thus prohibiting the
legitimate vehicles to receive safety messages in time. Drop-
ping safety messages can have drastic impact on the network
due to the sensitive nature of the messages involved within
vehicular environment. Therefore, we defined this attacker
model to evaluate the efficiency of MARINE in identifying
true information in presence of such MiTM attackers within
the network. In this attacker model, half attackers are dropping
the messages, while the other half are delaying the safety
messages with a factor of ‘d’ before broadcasting it.
3) Attacker Model 3: Next, an advanced version of the
MiTM attackers is defined where the attackers behaves in-
telligently by adopting a random pattern within the network.
The attacker initially behaves as a legitimate node for short
span of time to gain the trust of the vehicles within the
network. The attacker starts behaving maliciously only after
becoming part of the legitimate network by gaining trust of
the participating vehicles. In this defined model, the attacker
specifically shares compromised messages and ratings with
the neighbouring vehicles during its attack mode. Moreover,
some of the attacker nodes are dropping the safety messages
apart from sharing misleading compromised messages and
trust ratings.
C. Performance Evaluation Metrics
We evaluated MARINE from accuracy point of view due
to the fact that the trust model aim to disseminate trusted,
accurate and authentic information within the network. To this
end, we considered following metrics which are categorized
into two distinct classes for the evaluation of our trust model.
1) Trust Model Accuracy: This class of evaluation metrics
is defined specifically to evaluate the accuracy of MARINE
in presence of MiTM attackers. Therefore, following three
metrics are used which are considered as one of the most im-
portant trust evaluation criteria within highly mobile networks
like VANET [45].
(a) Precision (Prec) – depicts that ability of the trust model
to correctly predict the trustworthy event. Let PD|H
illustrates the probability of the node to detect as mali-
cious, given the legitimate node and PD|D represents the
probability to detect node as malicious, given malicious
node, then Prec can be given as:
Prec =
PD|D
PD|H + PD|D
(10)
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Fig. 7: Accuracy of Proposed Trust Model under Attacker Model 1 (a) Precision (b) Recall (c) F-Score
(b) Recall (Rec) – depicts the trust model capability to cor-
rectly detect the nodes disseminating malicious content.
Let PD|D presents the probability of trust model to
detect node as malicious, given node is malicious and
PH|D resents probability of detecting malicious node as
legitimate node, given the node is malicious, then Recall
can be mathematically expressed as:
Rec =
PD|D
PH|D + PD|D
(11)
(c) F-Score – A weighted average of Prec and Rec, depicting
the accuracy of the trust model [46]. Higher the F-Score,
the more accurate is the trust model. F-Score is given as:
F − Score = 2×
[
Prec ×Rec
Prec +Rec
]
(12)
2) Impact of Trust: We also considered trust model related
metrics, illustrating the ability and efficiency of the trust model
to detect true events within the network [47]. To do so,
following three metrics are defined:
(a) Trust – A significant evaluation metric which portray
the capability of the trust model to detect and classify
received messages either as legitimate or malicious.
(b) Trust Metric Variation for Legitimate Nodes – Illustrates
the behaviour of the trust metric within honest nodes
in presence of MiTM attackers sharing compromised
messages and trust ratings.
(c) Trust Metric Variation for Malicious Nodes – Depicts the
ability of the trust model to enforce the minimum trust
level of MiTM attackers.
D. Simulation Results
This section discusses the performance of MARINE trust
model in VANET in presence of three variants of MiTM
attacker. Further, the efficiency of MARINE is computed
against a baseline trust model which evaluates trust on the
received information from the vehicles via weighted voting
method. We chose this method as a baseline trust model as it
has been used widely in various trust management methods,
such as [31], [48]–[52].
E. Accuracy of MARINE in Presence of Attacker Model 1
Fig. 7 shows the accuracy of MARINE under attacker model
1, where the adversary is changing the content of safety
messages and tampering trust ratings before sharing it with
neighbouring vehicles within its vicinity. Fig. 7a and Fig.
7b illustrates the precision and recall of our proposed trust
model, depicting that the network achieves high precision and
recall for low number of MiTM attackers. However, as the
number of MiTM attackers with message tampering ability
is increased from 5% to 40%, the corresponding precision
and recall decreases. This is due to the fact that increasing
MiTM attackers will result in the generation of high number of
compromised messages. This limits the ability of the legitimate
vehicles to classify between trusted and malicious content as
the network is polluted with high number of malicious content.
However, MARINE performs better in terms of identifying
and classifying trusted and malicious data due to the fact that
dishonest nodes are identified quickly at the lower layers, thus,
enabling the vehicles to limit and revoke the data generated
from malicious nodes. Next, MARINE also integrates role-
oriented vehicles, thus enabling the legitimate vehicles to
receive trusted information, even in presence of high number
of attackers. On the other hand, baseline trust model is built
upon weighted voting, which can be compromised if the le-
gitimate vehicles are surrounded by high number of malicious
nodes. Therefore, for high number of malicious nodes, baseline
trust model achieves lower precision and recall values. As an
illustration, precision for MARINE falls from 99% to 87%
if the number of adversaries are increased from 5% to 40%,
while precision for baseline trust model falls drastically from
90.5% to approximately 75%. This depicts that MARINE is
efficient in dealing with MiTM attackers which are dealing
with message alteration ability.
Further, comparing to baseline trust model, MARINE
achieves high accuracy in terms of F-score as shown in Fig. 7c.
For instance, MARINE ensures accuracy over 91.5%, while F-
score for baseline trust model falls below 80% for a network
with 25% MiTM adversaries, highlighting that MARINE is
more accurate in identifying MiTM attackers with content
alteration ability.
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F. Accuracy of MARINE in Presence of Attacker Model 2
Fig. 8 depicts the accuracy of MARINE in terms of
precision, recall and F-score in presence attacker model 2,
where the attackers are deliberately dropping and delaying the
messages to be shared with legitimate vehicles. Dropping or
delaying safety messages by the malicious nodes results in
drastic impact on the network as the legitimate vehicles fails
to receive significant information in time. This phenomenon
is clearly highlighted in Fig 8, where the precision, recall and
F-score are decreased as more and more MiTM attackers are
introduced in the network. However, MARINE is efficient in
detecting such malicious nodes due to the fact that the lower
layers of the vehicle quickly detects the nodes implementing
MiTM attacks. For a network containing high number of
MiTM attackers (30 %), MARINE ensures high precision (88
%) and recall (84.5 %) values, concluding that MARINE is
efficient in identifying malicious nodes in VANET. On the
other hand, baseline trust model relies on weighted voting,
thus the presence of malicious nodes prohibit the legitimate
nodes to receive information in time. Similarly, it fails to detect
the messages dropped by the MiTM attackers. Fig. 8a and Fig.
8b interprets that for a network with 30% MiTM attackers, the
precision and recall falls below 75% and 70% respectively for
baseline trust model.
Next, the accuracy of MARINE in terms of F-score is
shown in Fig. 8c, suggesting that MARINE ensures high
accuracy, thus outperforming the baseline trust model. When
the number of malicious nodes are increased from 5% to
40%, accuracy of MARINE is decreased from approximately
95.5% to about 81%, comparing to baseline trust model, where
accuracy falls from 87.7% to about 66%. This depicts that
MARINE is an attack-resistant to MiTM attacks, where it
ensures to propagate trusted information, even in presence of
high number of malicious nodes.
G. Accuracy of MARINE in Presence of Attacker Model 3
We also conducted a set of experiments in Fig. 9 for an
advanced version of MITM attackers, which are behaving
intelligently within the network to deceive legitimate nodes
and pollute the network with compromised and tampered mes-
sages. Fig. 9a and Fig. 9b depicts that introducing such MiTM
attackers with zig-zag attack pattern have severe impact on
the network, where introducing such malicious attack activity
reduces precision and recall of the network. As the attackers
are behaving and launching attacks in the network intelligently,
therefore, it is very difficult for legitimate vehicles to identify
such MiTM attackers. However, MARINE enables the vehicles
to detect such MiTM attackers with random attack pattern,
which is depicted clearly in Fig. 9a and Fig. 9b. This is due to
the following reasons: (1) The node-centric trust establishment
at the lower layers results in the early identification of MiTM
attackers, (2) The inter-vehicular trust module where trust is
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Fig. 10: Impact of Trust (a) Trust Metric (b) Trust Variation for Legitimate Nodes (c) Trust Variation for Malicious Nodes
established based on the message quality enables the legitimate
vehicles to verify the received messages from MiTM attacker,
and (3) the presence of role-based trust vehicles ensures
the propagation of trusted information in the network, thus
enabling the legitimate vehicles to receive trusted information.
For a network with 30% MiTM attackers, MARINE achieves
approximately 85% precision and 80% recall, while it falls
below 70% and 60% respectively for baseline trust model,
highlighting that MARINE is efficient in disseminating trusted
information in presence of MiTM attackers with zig-zag attack
pattern.
Finally, Fig. 9c highlights the F-score of MARINE which
is one of the significant metric to measure the accuracy of
the trust model. As shown in Fig. 9a and Fig. 9b, varying the
MiTM nodes with random attack pattern affects the overall
performance of VANET, where the precision and recall falls
drastically. Therefore, F-score can depict that how accurate is
the trust model in detecting MiTM attackers and malicious
content. The results suggest that compared to baseline trust
model, our proposal achieves high accuracy in terms of F-
score, i.e., in presence of 35% malicious nodes, our trust model
ensures accuracy over 80%, while the baseline trust model
achieve accuracy approximately 60%.
H. Impact of Trust on MARINE
Figure 10 shows the efficiency of MARINE to identify
and classify malicious content in terms of trust perspective.
Specifically, we calculated the behaviour of trust metric for
MARINE in presence of MiTM attackers in Fig. 10a. It
illustrates that when the network is polluted with MiTM
attackers, generating malicious content, trust of the network
decreases. This is due to the fact that higher malicious nodes
results in limiting the ability of the legitimate nodes to identify
true events as the network is polluted with high number of
malicious content. However, comparing to the baseline trust
model, MARINE ensures higher trust value, depicting that
MARINE is efficient in identifying and classifying the true
events in presence of adversaries. This is due to the following
reasons: (1) The presence of role-oriented vehicles enable the
legitimate vehicles to receive true events in the network, (2)
MARINE intelligently identifies node transmitting malicious
content at the lower layers, thus, enabling the evaluator node to
quickly distinguish between legitimate vehicle and an attacker.
For a network containing 40% MiTM attackers, MARINE
achieves 79% trust level, while, this level falls below 50%
for baseline trust model.
Next, Fig. 10b and Fig. 10c depicts the variation of trust
within legitimate and malicious nodes respectively. These
metrics are very important as they depicts that how efficient
the trust model is evaluating trust on the received information.
Fig. 10b illustrates that trust within the legitimate nodes never
falls below trust threshold, i.e., 0.5, even in presence of high
number of MiTM attackers. This ensures that MARINE trust
model experience very few false positives in the network.
On the other hand, trust among the MiTM nodes is always
below the considered threshold level as shown in Fig. 10c,
thus assuming that very limited false negatives are generated
via our proposal.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented MARINE, a novel trust model
to increase network security by quickly detecting and revok-
ing dishonest vehicles and their generated content. MARINE
operates in two steps: First step involves early detection
of malicious nodes where entity-centric trust evaluations is
performed by introducing several plausibility checks within
the network. Node is classified as malicious if it fails to
satisfy all the evaluation criteria. Once, legitimate node is
identified via step 1, the next phase involves the data-centric
trust evaluation, where the trustworthiness of the data is
performed. This mechanism enables the vehicles to quickly
identify misbehaving vehicle along with its malicious content,
which is then revoked from the pool of trusted vehicles.
Extensive simulations are carried out to the efficiency of
MARINE in presence of three different flavors of MiTM at-
tackers. Simulations results suggest that MARINE is an attack-
resistant trust model which provides high accuracy in detecting
trusted content in presence of MiTM attacks. Moreover, the
performance of MARINE is bench-marked against a baseline
trust model, which clearly shows that MARINE performs
better in terms of achieving high precision, recall and F-
score in presence of three MiTM attacker models. This is due
to the fact that MARINE enables the participating nodes to
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quickly identify dishonest nodes and prevent them to pollute
the network from malicious content.
Our future step includes the integration of social networks
with MARINE, which is one significant source of providing
information for connected vehicles within VANET.
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